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Abstract: Schopenhauer’s invective is legendary among philosophers, and is unmatched in the 
historical canon. But these complaints are themselves worthy of careful consideration: they are 
rooted in Schopenhauer’s philosophy of language, which itself reflects the structure of his 
metaphysics. This short chapter argues that Schopenhauer’s vitriol rewards philosophical attention; 
not because it expresses his critical take on Fichte, Hegel, Herbart, Schelling, and Schleiermacher, 
but because it neatly illustrates his philosophy of language. Schopenhauer’s epithets are not merely 
spiteful slurs; instead, they reflect deep-seated theoretical and methodological commitments to 
transparency of exposition. 
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1. Introduction 
Schopenhauer is perhaps best known today for his intemperate invective against his contemporaries, 
especially Fichte and Hegel, whom he subjected to legendary quantities of abuse. It seems fair to say 
that, so far as most readers are concerned, these venomous vituperations look rather like jealous 
ranting. And to some extent, the reaction is warranted: a careful catalogue of Schopenhauer’s 
obloquies betrays a singular concern—an obsession, even—with the fame and fortune lavished 
upon those he most reviled, and the studied indifference with which his own work was first 
received. Franco Volpi, for instance, has recently published an alphabetized compendium of 
Schopenhauer’s insults, in which he points to the irony of Schopenhauer’s own sentiment that the 
argumentum ad personam is the last resort of a player who has otherwise lost the game, and been bested 
(though perhaps also wronged) by a superior intellect ([28], p. 5). 
 Volpi’s catalogue presents Schopenhauer’s insults as de-contextualized and unsourced 
objects of fun, which they certainly are; but taken in context, Schopenhauer’s bilious rhetorical 
flourishes actually reward sustained critical attention. A closer examination of the insults he so 
clearly delighted in heaping upon Fichte, Hegel, Herbart, Schelling, and Schleiermacher (as well as 
the Danish Academy and the German public) reveals a deeper disagreement over the nature of 
concepts and the function of language, as well as with academic integrity and the norms and 
structure of intellectual discourse. In other words, Schopenhauer’s insults hold a mirror up to his 
philosophy of language. It is also worth noting that although Schopenhauer’s scolding may shock 
today’s readers, it was actually quite common in nineteenth-century German academic circles to 
publicly excoriate one’s rivals in order to underscore the importance of one’s own views (if not quite 
to that extent) ([1], p. 74-5). 
 This is not to say that we can read a latent philosophy of language implicit in the text of his 
remonstrations; Schopenhauer’s account of language is explicitly and independently presented in his 
main writings, although it is somewhat scattered and may seem insubstantial by today’s standards. 
But it is important to remember that we have benefitted from three-quarters of a century of 
empirical linguistics and cognitive science—for a defence of Schopenhauer against the charge of 
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etymological dilettantism, see ([5] p. 152); for a sketch of how Schopenhauer’s ideas fit in with later 
linguistic and cognitive science frameworks, see also ([5] p. 157-63), and [6], this volume). 
 Nor do I mean to suggest that Schopenhauer’s remarks betray a failure of engagement with 
the ideas of his contemporaries. On the contrary, he frequently devotes lengthy passages to 
explaining the substance of his disagreement with the German Idealists. Indeed, it is worth noting 
that Schopenhauer was not given to slighting all those with whom he disagreed—quite the opposite, 
as his treatment of Berkeley, Hume, Kant, and Locke (among others) demonstrates. In fact, Julian 
Young has argued that Schopenhauer subscribes to the same concept-empiricism as the British 
empiricists ([30] Ch. 2, §4, p. 22-5), and David E. Cartwright has offered a careful analysis of 
Schopenhauer’s intellectual debts to, admiration for, and disagreement with, John Locke [2]. My 
point, rather, is that we should read Schopenhauer’s animadversions in light of his linguistic 
commitments, treating them as case studies offering a useful illustration of the principles animating 
his philosophy of language. 
 I shall begin, in  the next section, by sketching the essentials of Schopenhauer’s philosophy 
of language, focusing in particular on its basis in his analysis of concepts. It is here that we find 
Schopenhauer’s explanation for the differences between animal and human cognition, as well as his 
explanation of the role abstraction plays in facilitating thought. From these premises, I will turn to a 
closer examination of Schopenhauer’s charges against his contemporaries, which I argue centred on 
their misuse of our powers of abstraction and, consequently, their blatant disregard for the evidence 
given by intuitive perception. 
 
2. Schopenhauer’s philosophy of language 
In order to discuss Schopenhauer’s philosophy of language, one must first say something about his 
analysis of concepts. But my goal in this chapter is somewhat narrower in scope, since it concerns 
Schopenhauer’s infamous remarks on Fichte, Hegel, Herbart, Schelling, and Schleiermacher, and 
what they can teach us about his philosophy of language. Accordingly, I do not have the space to 
offer a detailed exposition of Schopenhauer’s analysis of concepts—an analysis which, in any case, 
has already been amply documented by Malter [13], Neeley [14], Dümig [5], and, especially, 
Dobrzański [3] and [4], this volume. Nevertheless, something must be said about concepts, since 
these hold the key to Schopenhauer’s philosophy of language. 
 The first thing to note is that Schopenhauer relies on concepts to mark the boundary 
between the animal and the human realms. Humans and non-human animals alike all produce 
sounds, and according to Schopenhauer these sounds inevitably give voice to the stimulations and 
movements of individual expressions of the creature’s Will ([21] §298, p. 565)—they embody desires 
and hungers, needs and wants, and basic reactions. But human beings also enjoy the unique capacity 
to use these sounds to indicate objects in our environment; we are endowed with reason, which 
allows us to derive concepts (abstract representations) from our perceptions and to use sounds to 
designate these concepts ([22] §3, p. 27).  
 This is not to say that we speak by means of aural signs communicating images of our 
intuited percepts, except insofar as we sometimes use a mental image as a representative of a 
concept, e.g. when we use the image of some particular dog (or stereotype of a breed of dog) to 
stand for the whole concept ([21] §28, p. 102; for more on Schopenhauer’s denial that thinking 
requires mental images, see ([7], this volume, esp. §4). Such cases aside, Schopenhauer explicitly 
denies that concepts are mental images. The question of how it is that words become meaningful is 
discussed in [6] and [12] (both in this volume), as well as in [4] and [25]; here, I follow Dümig [6], 
who emphasizes Schopenhauer’s remark that “the meaning of the speech is immediately understood 
[...] Reason speaks to reason while remaining in its own province: it sends and receives abstract 
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concepts, representations that cannot be intuited [...]” ([23] §9, p. 62-3 and [17] §28). The point, in 
other words, is that we just immediately grasp the meanings of words ([25] p. 379). 
 Thinking, according to Schopenhauer, requires us to combine and separate concepts 
according to the rules codified by logic in the theory of judgements ([19] §29, p. 104-5. Concepts are 
abstracted from what is given to us by the world in intuitive perception; they allow us to abstract 
from the individual instances given to us in intuitive perception and think about the world at the 
general level ([27] p. 272). Schopenhauer thus reverses the epistemic priorities set by the scholastics 
and rationalists such as Descartes, Leibniz, and Wolfe: the representations of perception are intuitive 
and immediate, while concepts are merely abstract representations ([17] §26, p. 97; Schopenhauer 
seems to have been largely in agreement with Locke on this point—see [2]). This means that only 
intuitions can ever be said to be ‘clear’, since they are unmediated perceptions. Concepts, on the 
other hand, are called ‘distinct’ only when they can be decomposed into their constituent attributes, 
down to the level of concrete, individual intuitions ([27] p. 270-2). As Schopenhauer puts it, 
however, “Concepts are confused if one does not quite know their sphere, that is, if one cannot 
specify the other conceptual spheres which intersect or fill them, or which surround them” ([27] p. 
272 [my translation]; For an excellent explanation of just what Schopenhauer means by the ‘spheres’ 
of concepts, see [12], this volume. In other words, a confused concept is one which is not grounded 
in a perceptual intuition. Abstraction does not proceed from the many to the one, but rather from 
the one (individuals given in intuition) to the many (ideas given by concepts) ([27] 273-4). 
 It is this facility of abstract representation that allows human beings to think and reason, to 
execute plans and decide upon courses of action in addition to acting from mere impulse. That said, 
Schopenhauer did not think that language is necessary for thought, since words do not exhaust the 
perceptual content behind concepts; words merely simplify the tasks of communication and 
reasoning ([5] p. 155-6 and [4], this volume). So, although thinking is the manipulation of concepts, 
concepts are not the ultimate ground of knowledge, since they are mere abstractions from intuited 
perception, representations of representations. Only intuitions can ground knowledge in this way 
([23] §9, p. 63 and [27] p. 270-2). Notice, then, that abstract representation is something which we 
impose upon the world through our use of language. The world offers us only percepts; language 
mediates our experience of the world by imposing concepts upon the data given to us in perception 
([23] §9; see also [25] p. 370; Whether this amounts to a representational theory of language is an 
open question; for an excellent discussion of this issue, see [4], this volume). Indeed, Schopenhauer 
goes so far as to task philosophy with describing, in the abstract, the essence of the world given to 
us by intuitive, concrete cognition ([23] §15, p. 108-10). 
 Curiously, although Schopenhauer clearly states that non-human animals are not capable of 
abstraction and thus have no language, he does think that they understand proper names ([17] §26, 
p. 99). Since Schopenhauer did not think that non-human animals could mobilize concepts, this 
might suggest that he did not think of proper names as abstractions—labels, on a causal or hybrid 
framework—but rather as directly associated with an entity’s perceptual properties. And yet in his 
Berlin lectures, Schopenhauer makes it clear that concepts—among which he includes proper 
names—designate at the individual, or intuitive, level; they are abstractions ([27] p. 293). So how 
should we reconcile these two observations? 
 Presumably, Schopenhauer thought of names as abstractions because names are conferred 
by human beings, who use them to stand in for individuals. Indeed, he tells us that “in the 
judgement ‘Socrates is a philosopher’, several people could very well think of form, size, and other 
qualities of different people, which would nevertheless correspond to the concept of Socrates, 
because they never contain everything in the concept that is in the individual: the concept is always 
an abstractum, a thought, never a single individual thing” ([27] p. 293; translated by Jens Lemanski). 
In other words, the name ‘Socrates’ does not stand for a description of the man and all of his 
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properties, but rather designates a concept that abstracts from these and stand for his essence. Two 
people talking about Socrates may well associate different properties with the man, since the concept 
cannot hope to encompass them all; what matters is that their concepts each represent the essence 
of the man and, thus, converge on the right referent. So much for the human understanding of 
proper names; but what about non-human animals? 
 When Schopenhauer says that non-human animals can understand proper names, it seems 
most likely that he had his poodles—all of which shared the name ‘Atma’ ([1] p. 136)—in mind, 
since dogs and other animals can easily be taught to respond to the sounds constituting their names. 
But what does Schopenhauer’s use of ‘Atma’ tell Atma? Not very much, since, as we saw above, 
Schopenhauer did not think that animals could mobilize concepts, and because he characterized 
judgement as an operation exclusive to thinking, rather than to intuition ([27] p. 293). In other 
words, Schopenhauer’s use of ‘Atma’ conveys no descriptive content whatsoever (e.g. ‘Schopenhauer’s 
white poodle’) to Atma; rather, so far as she is concerned, it refers directly to her. Atma knows that 
‘Atma’ designates her, whatever she is, but she associates no judgement with her perception of the 
utterance. Atma knows enough to respond to the utterance of her name, but her conceptual reach 
goes no further. An animal can be taught to recognize and respond to uses of its name, but not to 
use it for communicative purposes of its own, since it lacks the capacity to mobilize concepts.  
 We should, of course, be wary of reading too much or too modern a theory of language into 
these remarks, especially given their apparent inconsistency. But if my explanation of 
Schopenhauer’s remarks is correct, then it seems as though he subscribed to a theory of naming and 
reference akin to the Millian, even though Mill would only articulate his views on the subject twenty-
five years after the publication of The World as Will and Representation, in A System of Logic (1843). To 
be sure, Schopenhauer’s remarks on the subject are nothing like as sophisticated as Mill’s, and they 
do not map on seamlessly; what they show, however, is that direct reference was in the air. At least, 
so long as we read Schopenhauer as tending towards more representationalism than towards a use-
theory of meaning (see, e.g., [4], this volume, which mediates between the use- and picture-theories, 
but emphasizes Schopenhauer’s representationalism; [12], by contrast, emphasizes the use-theory 
instead). 
 But let us return to Schopenhauer’s account of concepts. By way of a helpful analogy, 
Schopenhauer says that concepts are related to their root percepts in much the same way as 
arithmetical formulae are related to the operations of thought which give them their content, or as 
logarithms are related to their number ([17] §27, p. 100-1). Arithmetical formulae allow us to abstract 
away from particular cases to draw inferences and make generalizations grounded in logic. Consider 
Euler’s Formula:  
 
Euler’s Formula (EF) 
eix = cos x + i sin x 
 
EF is obtained by abstracting from certain features of functions in complex analysis, including 
algebraic geometry and number theory, and it helps us to say a great many things in engineering, 
mathematics, and physics. Each of its constants and variables takes a particular content, given by the 
mathematician’s domain of discourse; absent such specification, however, they remain free to roam 
across all possible interpretations. 
 It should be straightforwardly obvious, then, that the letters and symbols we use to express 
EF are largely meaningless without some guide to their interpretation. According to Schopenhauer, 
this is because they are only very loosely tied to perceptual intuitions, by means of subsidiary 
mathematical concepts which are themselves abstracted from other, more fundamental concepts. 
Eventually, when the yarn has been sufficiently unravelled, we will find some sort of perceptual 
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intuition. In other words, the statements we express using EF are attenuated by the successive 
degrees of abstraction required to generate them, until they approximate pseudo-concepts or “empty 
husks”. 
 In much the same way, Schopenhauer thought that the formulation of a concept pares a 
perceptual intuition down to its component parts, thereby allowing us to focus our attention on just 
some of its properties and relations at a time. The higher the level of abstraction, however, the less 
particular content remains in the concept ([17] §26, p. 98-9). So, when we abstract from the name 
‘Yuni’ to the kind ‘unicorn’, we strip our concept of its Yuni-the-unicorn-specific properties and boil 
it down to just its unicorn-specific properties; by the time we get from ‘unicorn’ to ‘x,’ the concept 
no longer has any named, horned-, or horse-content left to it at all, and can be manipulated in 
thought as easily as arithmetical formulae.  
 Concepts are thus necessarily severed from their intuitive content, and words are simply the 
arbitrary signs we use to fix concepts before us so that we can make use of them ([17] p. 99. But 
concepts do not refer to things in themselves, nor even to representations of things in themselves; 
they refer merely to the general representations we have created for ourselves by abstracting from 
the content of what is given to us intuitively in perception, which they then represent )([17] p. 99 and 
[23] §9; see also [4], this volume, which considers the question of just what Schopenhauer’s concepts 
actually refer to in more detail.). This helps to explain Schopenhauer’s pessimistic take on dogmatic 
metaphysics, which argued that metaphysics was rooted in reason (and thus in abstraction) rather 
than experience (perceptual intuition) ([8] p. 430-1). It also explains why Schopenhauer thought that 
perfect translations of most words is impossible, as well as why some languages lack words for 
concepts identified in others ([21] p. §299, p. 567-8; Schopenhauer’s theory of translation plays a 
crucial role in introducing his account of individual understanding—see [12], this volume, esp. 
§4.2.1-4.2.2)—e.g. ‘hygge’ in Danish, Hawaiian ‘pana po‘o’ or the Inuit ‘iktsuarpok’. Different words 
pick out different concepts, which in turn are grounded in slightly different perceptual intuitions.  
 Consequently, “even in mere prose the finest translation of all will relate to the original at 
best as the transposition of a given piece of music into another key relates to the original” ([21] 
§299, p. 568). Musical transposition shifts pitches up or down by a regular interval, and we usually 
transpose music when we want to play a piece on an instrument with a different range, because a 
musician or vocalist prefers a particular key, lacks the requisite range, or has not yet learned the 
original key. In other words, while the notes bear the same relationship to one another and the piece 
is therefore recognizably similar, it sounds quite different (since it is composed of different 
constituent parts; the sound will be higher or lower). To fill out the analogy, then, the idea is that 
translation is an exercise in approximation reflecting our inability to capture and communicate the 
givens of intuitive perception. Schopenhauer goes on to argue that the health of a language is thus to 
be measured by the ratio of its words to its concepts, so that an oversupply of concepts without 
words is a sign of intellectual poverty—a state which he thought aptly characterized contemporary 
German ([21] §300, p. 573). As Dümig has cautioned, however, we should not thereby conclude that 
Schopenhauer subscribed to linguistic relativism, according to which linguistic categories determine 
cognitive categories ([5] p. 157-8). For one thing, Schopenhauer explicitly rejects the identity of word 
and concept; for another, linguistic relativism gets the causal story backwards: words are derived 
from the need to communicate concepts, which are abstracted from intuitive perception. The 
perception precedes the development of cognitive categories, which in turn precede the deployment 
of linguistic signs. 
 It is also worth noticing that, according to Schopenhauer’s story, we cannot communicate 
the content of our intuitions directly because our bodies offer no mechanism by which to do so. 
Sight, to use Schopenhauer’s example, may well be more adept at or direct in discerning the world, 
but it does not come equipped with the ability to manipulate percepts so that they can easily be 
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communicated to others ([21] §301, p. 574-5; c.f. [6] §1, this volume, which argues that for 
Schopenhauer language has no social function, and serves primarily as a tool of internal processing). 
Consequently, we must resort to using language, which trades in audible rather than visual symbols. 
The result is that the content we communicate suffers from a doubled imperfection: (1) because in 
perceiving the world we merely perceive the phenomenal realm, and (2) because the tool we use to 
communicate this imperfect vision is itself only capable of transmitting a small part of what is 
intuited. 
 
3. Learning from the tirades 
It would be impractical for me to reproduce all of Schopenhauer’s delightfully barbed comments 
here. Those so interested, however, should start by consulting the following: WWR1 [23]: xx-xxi, 
xxiv, §37-40, §147, §263 *, §495-6, §508, and §517; WWR2 [24]: p. 12-3, 34 fn. 6, 40-1, 65, 70, 84, 
87, 192-3, 303, 316, 442-3, 464, 582, 590, and 616; Two Problems [22]: Preface 1 (esp. ¶xvii-xxvi, 
¶xxix-xxx), Preface 2  ¶xli; and therein, p. 99-100  ¶85-6 of FW, and p. 149 ¶147 of OBM; PP1: 6, 
21-8, 23 fn. 2, 70, 94-6, 132, 135, 141-2, 141 fn. 2, 144-6, 148, 153, 156-8, 161-3, 166-76, 178-80, 
182, 191-2, 196, 375 fn. 18, and 396; PP2: §9 p. 8-9, §10 p. 11, §11 p. 12, §21 p. 19, §28 p. 38, §42 p. 
59, §74 p. 104-5, §76 p. 109, §77 p. 112, §106 p. 196, §141 p. 279, §219 p. 431, §239 p. 456, 458, 
§241 p. 468, 470, §250 p. 483, §255 p. 486, §255 p. 486, §283 p. 516-8, 524, 541-2, §297 p. 561-2, 
and §377 p. 641-2; FR [17]: §V p. vi-vii, §VII p. 11-2., §VIII p. 15 & 17, §14 p. 22, §20 p. 39-40, §21 
p. 83-4, §26 p. 99, §34 p. 112-3, 117-8, 124; On Vision [18]: §III p. vi *; and Will in Nature [19]: 
xxi-ii, 6-7, and 141. 
 Worse, readers might find such a reproduction tedious and repetitive, since they articulate 
the same basic complaints—and because Schopenhauer’s meticulous editorial process saw him 
repeat his best turns of phrase across later editions of his works. Yet since my goal is to explain the 
root criticism that informs Schopenhauer’s contumely remarks, I would be remiss if I did not 
identify at least a few representative instances of his tongue-lashings: 
 
1. A tendency of minds to operate with such abstract and too widely 
comprehended concepts has shown itself at almost all times. Ultimately it 
may be due to a certain indolence of the intellect, which finds it too onerous 
to be always controlling thought through perception. Gradually such unduly 
wide concepts are then used like algebraical symbols, and cast about here 
and there like them. In this way philosophizing degenerates into a mere 
combining, a kind of lengthy reckoning, which (like all reckoning and 
calculating) employs and requires only the lower faculties. In fact, there 
ultimately results from this a mere display of words, the most monstrous 
example of which is afforded us by mind-destroying Hegelism, where it is 
carried to the extent of pure nonsense. But scholasticism also often 
degenerated into word-juggling ([24] p. 40; Schopenhauer says much the 
same about Schellingians in his Berlin Lectures ([27] p. 276). Pluder [15] §1 
and §2.2 (this volume) offers an excellent explanation of Schopenhauer’s 
derision for Scholasticism). 
 
2. [...] a very peculiar device is often employed whose invention is traceable to 
Messrs. Fichte and Schelling. I refer to the artful trick of writing abstrusely, 
that is to say, unintelligibly; here the real subtlety is so to arrange the 
gibberish that the reader must think he is in the wrong if he does not 
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understand it, whereas the writer knows perfectly well that it is he who is at 
fault, since he simply has nothing to communicate that is really intelligible, 
that is to say, has been clearly thought out ([20] p. 162). 
 
3. They therefore summarily forsook the only correct path found in the end by 
those wise men [viz., Bacon, Kant, and Locke], and philosophized at 
random with all kinds of raked-up concepts, unconcerned as to their origin 
and true content, so that Hegel's pretended wisdom finally resulted in 
concepts which had no origin at all, but were rather themselves the origin 
and source of things ([24] p. 41). 
 
4. [...] good style depends mainly on whether a writer really has something to 
say; it is simply this small matter that most of our present-day authors lack 
and is responsible for their bad style. But in particular, the generic 
characteristic of the philosophical works of the nineteenth century is that of 
writing without really having something to say; it is common to them all and 
can therefore be just as well studied in Salat as in Hegel, in Herbart as in 
Schleiermacher. Then according to the homeopathic method, the weak 
minimum of an idea is diluted with a fifty-page torrent of words and now 
with boundless confidence in the truly German patience of the reader the 
author calmly continues the twaddle on page after page. The mind that is 
condemned to such reading hopes in vain for real, solid, and substantial 
ideas; it pants and thirsts for any ideas as does a traveler for water in the 
Arabian desert and must remain parched ([20] p. 163). 
 
Word-juggling and philosophizing at random; ideas diluted to a weak minimum and spewed in a 
torrent of empty words; abstruse gibberish arranged to puff up the writer and denigrate his 
interlocutors; these are Schopenhauer’s complaints. Yet there is much more substance to 
Schopenhauer’s diatribes than to the grousing of a grumpy old man raging against the dying of the 
licht. 
 The problem, as Schopenhauer sees it, is that Hegel and his ilk are preoccupied with 
manipulating the “empty husks” of concepts, turning them over and over again in order to derive 
ever-new and fanciful results bearing no essential connection to the world of perceptual intuition 
([24] p. 84). G. Steven Neeley characterizes these as ‘pseudo-concepts’ and ‘nonsensical utterances’ 
([14] p. 49). In other words, Schopenhauer’s complaint was that the German Idealists misused 
abstractions, without regard for either (1) the fact that the more abstract the concept, the less 
perceptual content it possesses and, thus, the less epistemically sound its grounding, and (2) the laws 
of thought which govern the manipulation of abstract symbols (viz., identity, non-contradiction, 
excluded middle, and sufficient reason; for an explanation of just what Schopenhauer and his 
contemporaries considered “laws of thought,” see [15], this volume, §2.1). Allow me to explain. 
 When Schopenhauer accuses his contemporaries of employing a homeopathic method that 
dilutes ideas to a weak minimum, he is expressing a concern about the level of abstraction employed 
when they contrast one concept with its opposite—e.g., of finite and infinite, being and non-being, 
or unity, plurality, and multiplicity ([24] p. 84 and [17] §26, p. 99)—and from this process draw 
inferences about the nature of the noumenal. The abstract ideas resulting from this process of 
comparison are so detached from the perceptual kernel underlying them that they cannot be used to 
communicate, to impart knowledge about the author’s perceptual intuition. Unaccompanied by 
perception, these concepts can yield only the most general knowledge of the thing represented, if 
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that. They are an invitation for us to explain words with other words—that is to say, to use one 
imperfect communicative mechanism to communicate another, with ever-diminishing returns ([24] 
p. 71-2). In other words, a-perceptual concepts are as empty of particular content as logic’s 
constants and variables. No concept can hope to communicate its associated perception directly 
since, mediated as it is by the use of words, it amounts to an incomplete abstraction from 
perception. The most abstract concepts (such as those of logic and mathematics) are necessarily the 
least closely tied to perception, and the less grounded in perception a concept is, the more 
meaningless the words signifying it become. That said, Schopenhauer took exception to Euclidean 
geometry because he thought that its reliance on diagrams forestalled the possibility of gaining any 
real insight into the laws of spatial relationships underpinning those diagrams. See, for example, [22] 
§15 and [7], this volume, esp. §3. 
 Consider, for example, the uses to which we put predicates and variables in first-order logic: 
we use P(x) to denote any statement P concerning the variable object x. We combine variables with 
constants to get terms, and we combine terms with connectives, delimiters (i.e. brackets), and 
quantifiers to build the well-formed formulae that allow us to draw valid inferences regardless of the 
particular content of each abstract variable, constant, or predicate. From Schopenhauer’s 
perspective, we start with propositions, which express linguistic content, and abstract away from 
them by introducing variables, constants, etc., in order to focus our attention on the logical 
relationships underpinning our use of words. That said, Schopenhauer was quite dismissive of logic, 
and he followed his contemporaries in characterizing it as largely useless, since the rules of logic 
were supposed to govern thinking at the pre-reflective level. For an excellent explanation of 
Schopenhauer’s and his contemporaries’ attitude towards logic, see [15], this volume, esp. §1. But 
Schopenhauer made one significant exception: the rules of logic are useful when it comes to 
exposing deliberate attempts to deceive in an argument. And this is exactly what Schopenhauer 
accuses his contemporaries of attempting. 
 The concepts deployed by the German Idealists, Schopenhauer thinks, are no more than 
logical constants or variables, capable of being filled by any particular content whatsoever. Worse 
still, according to Schopenhauer, the Idealists do not offer us a guide to their interpretation, but 
leave us to interpret their pseudo-concepts as we please. This, then, is the crux of the problem, for 
the allegation here is that the use of these abstractions is not even underpinned by a communicative 
intention (as is the case in logic and mathematics).  
 This is why Schopenhauer thinks that, even when speaking in their native tongue, ‘those of 
limited ability’ (including, presumably, the “thick-“ and “shallow-skulled” followers of “Hegelry”—
[20] p. 166) 
 
always merely make use of hackneyed phrases (phrases banales, abgenutzte 
Redensarten); and even these are put together with so little skill that we see 
how imperfectly aware they are of their meaning and how little their whole 
thinking goes beyond the mere words, so that it is not very much more than 
parrot chatter. For the opposite reason, originality of idiom and individual 
fitness of every expression used by a man are an infallible symptom of 
outstanding intellect ([21] §299, p. 569-70). 
 
For more on Schopenhauer’s association of genius with transparency of exposition and the ability to 
compare concepts with perceptions, see [26]. Rather than use language to communicate their 
intuitive perceptions of the noumenal, Hegel and his “mercenary followers” ([20] p. 96) instead offer 
us a string of symbols and instruct us to make of them what we will. We are given words—“empty, 
hollow, disgusting verbiage” ([17] §20, p. 127-8)—rather than ideas; not so much a thought as a 
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parrot’s squawk, perhaps paired with a squeak and contrasted to a screech. Nor is this cacophony 
governed by the laws of thought, since these are gleefully jettisoned in service of the infamous 
“dialectic” which plays havoc with identity, non-contradiction, and excluded middle, if not also 
sufficient reason; c.f. [16] Preface 1, esp. p. 16-9 ¶xx-xxiii, where Schopenhauer takes issue with 
Hegel’s apparent misunderstanding of syllogistic logic and the notion of a contradiction. Indeed, 
how could it be so governed when its component sounds are utterly devoid of representational 
content in the first place? The result, Schopenhauer says, is that “their voice found an echo which 
even now reverberates and spreads in the numb skulls of a thousand stooges” ([17] §20, p. 127-8). 
  
4. Conclusion 
I have tried, throughout this chapter, to remain neutral about the merit of Schopenhauer’s 
accusations against his contemporaries. Determining their worth requires much more, and more 
careful, scholarship than I have had the space to undertake here. And, indeed, this is work that many 
have already tackled—see, e.g. [9], [10], [11], [29], and [31]. Instead, I have simply tried to show that 
Schopenhauer’s blistering invective gains its content—and its bite!—from his analyses of concepts, 
and of language more broadly. I have argued that the precise content of the vitriol Schopenhauer 
infamously directs at his contemporaries is worthy of philosophical attention—not because it 
expresses his critical take on Fichte, Hegel, Herbart, Schelling, and Schleiermacher (which it does), 
but because it neatly illustrates his philosophy of language, and his analysis of concepts. In particular, 
it draws our attention to his emphasis on the epistemic value of perceptual intuition. As long as we 
stick to what is given to us in intuition, Schopenhauer thought, then we cannot err: intuition is 
sufficient unto itself ([23] §8, p. 58). Abstract reasoning helps us to communicate our concepts to 
others ([23] §6, p. 43), but it also introduces new sources of doubt and error, since it takes us further 
away from the givens of intuitive perception. The Idealists’ cardinal sin was just to abuse our faculty 
of abstraction, piling ever more concepts atop one another without pausing to anchor them in 
intuitive perception. The result, I have argued, is that Schopenhauer’s epithets are not merely spiteful 
slurs. Instead, they reflect a deep-seated theoretical, as well as methodological, commitment to 
transparency  of exposition. 
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